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                    TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
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             Transcript of Proceedings taken at 400 Mrak
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   Hall Drive, King Hall, Room 1303, Davis, California,
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   commencing at 1:35 p.m., MONDAY, DECEMBER 8, 2014,
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   before Wendy Harrity, CSR No. 11494.
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MONDAY, DECEMBER 8, 2014, DAVIS, CALIFORNIA

1:36, P.M.

MR. MANDELBAUM: We will now be moving into the hearing portion of our meeting, the hearing related to the Modified Fair Employment Housing Act Regulations.

And so -- are we on the record? Okay. We are here on the record. The time is 1:36 p.m., on Monday,

December 8, 2014. We're here on the campus of UC Davis,

School of Law, 400 Mrak Hall Drive, Room 1303, Davis,

California.

My name is Chaya Mandelbaum, Chairperson of the
Fair Employment and Housing Council. And joining me
today are members of the Fair Employment and Housing
Council, Council members Dale Brodsky, Chanee Franklin
Minor, Patricia Perez, and Andrew Schneiderman, as well
as Ex Officio Member and Acting Director of the
Department of Fair Employment and Housing, Annmarie
Billotti.

Even though we had made initial introductions and, again, welcome you to this hearing, the purpose of this hearing is to receive public comments regarding issuance of the amendment to the Fair Employment and Housing Act Regulations proposed by the Fair Employment and Housing Council.

This rule making action clarifies, makes 1 specific and supplements existing state regulations interpreting the FEHA set forth in Government Code Section 12900xx. As it relates to employment, the FEHA prohibits harassment and discrimination because of race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical 7 condition, genetic information, marital status, sex, 9 gender, gender identity, gender expression, age, sexual 10 orientation and military or veteran status. regulations will appear on the California Code of 11 Regulations, Federal 2, Sections 11005.1 to 11141. 12 13 Copies of the proposed amendment to the FEHA regulations 14 are available on the table outside of the room. For those of you who testify, we will also have 15 regulations available for your use. The text of the 16 council's proposed regulation is also available on the 17 18 council's web page at www.dfeh.ca.gov/fehcouncil.htn. 19 The council is holding this hearing as the part of its 20 formal rule making process. We noticed this public 21 hearing more than 45 days ago in the California 22 Regulatory Notice Register published on October 24th, 23 2014, and also via e-mail sent to more than 7,00024 individuals and stakeholders and via social media via 25 Facebook, Linkedin and Twitter and to more than 800

individuals and stakeholders on the same date. 1 Pursuant to this notice, we are taking testimonies today on the proposed amendment to the FEHA regulations. We will also accept written comments to the proposed regulation until 5:00 p.m. today, December 8, 82014. You may e-mail written comments to the council at 7 fehcouncil@dfeh.ca.gov. If you prefer, you may mail them to Council Chair Annmarie Billotti at DFEH 9 Headquarters at 2218 Kausen Drive, Suite 100, Elk Grove, 10 California 95758. If you brought a written copy of your 11 comment, please give them to the Brian Sperber in front of the room. If you have not brought a written copy of 12 13 your comment today, we would appreciate it if you would 14 provide us a written copy by 5:00 p.m. today, 15 December 8, 2014. Anyone who testifies here today or submits written comments will receive a copy the changes 16 17 or amendments that council makes to this proposed 18 amendment to the FEHA regulation. Also anyone who testifies or submits written comments will have a 15-day 19 20 period within which to make written comments on any 21 further changes to the proposed amendments to the FEHA regulations. The council and DFEH staff will consider 22 23 each comment here today, as well as all written comments 24 received. The council will respond to each comment in 25 writing with its final statement of reasons which will

become part of the council's rulemaking record. 1 hearing is being transcribed by a certified court reporter. The transcript of the hearing, as well at all written comments received here today, will also be part of the council's official rulemaking record. 6 Because this hearing is being transcribed, it is 7 critical that anyone speaking does so clearly and that only one person speak at a time. If you have not 9 already done so, please sign in on the attendance sheet. 10 If you sign in, we will know that you were here today 11 and be able to send you a copy of any changes to the proposed amendment to the FEHA regulations. 12 13 Also, if you would like to testify, please be sure 14 that you have indicated on the sign-in sheets that you would like to testify so we may call on you. You will 15 not be sworn in when you testify. However, we ask that 16 17 you come to the front of the room so that the court 18

that you have indicated on the sign-in sheets that you would like to testify so we may call on you. You will not be sworn in when you testify. However, we ask that you come to the front of the room so that the court reporter can take down your testimony. Please begin by stating and spelling your name and stating your affiliation. Also, if you are commenting on a specific regulation, please identify the section number of the regulation so we that may refer to it as you speak. We will hear testimony until all those wishing to testify here today have had an opportunity to do so.

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Does anyone have any questions before we begin?

Not seeing any, we are ready to begin. So anyone 1 wishing to provide a public comment, please feel free to address us using the podium and microphone in the front of the room. 5 MR. LEBOWITZ: Good afternoon. My name is Noah Lebowitz. I can spell it: L-E-B, as in boy, O-W-I-T-Z. 7 I am a partner in the San Francisco law firm of Duckworth Peters Lebowitz and Olivier, here today on behalf as the Chair of the California Employment Lawyers 9 10 Association Fair Employment and Housing Council Regulation Subsidy. So I have written comments from the 11 12 organization. I can hand them all to you. 13 MR. MANDELBAUM: Oh, great. 14 MR. SCHNEIDERMAN: You'll have to speak in French, though. 15 MR. LEBOWITZ: Okay. One of those has original 16 17 signatures on it, I apologize. That should be our 18 official part of the record. Um, so again, I am here on 19 behalf of CELA. 20 The letter I just submitted dated today has the 21 bulk -- almost all of our comments contained within it 22 and I am not going through it piece by piece. I will 23 leave it to the subcommittee to go through and look at

25 highlights and talk about things that are important to

the technical changes. I am going to hit some

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discuss and then another member of our community, Joan 1 Harrington, is also here today. And she is going on address the council after I completed on some different topics. So, um, looking at the letter just submitted, on the second page is where I would like to start comments this afternoon on Section 1108, Subsection C. 7 If you want to reference the actual attachment document, as well. 9 Is that how you want to do it again? 10 MR. MANDELBAUM: Yeah, I think that's easiest for people to follow along. 11 12 MR. LEBOWITZ: Okay. So looking at the 13 definition of employees on page 4. Hopefully our 14 versions are the same. So in particular we are looking at Subsection C5, which is the language talking about 15 when an individual is potentially employed by either a 16 17 temporary service agency or the actual primary employer. 18 So we're talking about potential dual employment or 19 joint employment or separate employment by either of the 20 entities. And we think that -- the intent of the 21 passage as written is fine to the extent that it is an 22 attempt to say that a person can be considered an 23 employee either of the temporary agency or of the 24 primary employer, for lack of a better word for primary 25 employer, place where the working is actually taking

place. But we also want to make sure that it is not misconstrued in the negative to say that that person cannot also be considered jointly employed by both entities because we know that that is the law. There can be situations where the employee can be considered employed by both the temporary service agency and the employer where the actual work is taking place.

So we added -- we have some suggested language here in our letter to add to the end to supplement the language that's already here in the regulations or is being proposed to be in the regulations. That there is nothing in this definition shall preclude a finding that an individual is an employee jointly of an employer contracting, temporary service agency and the temporary service agency itself with regard to such terms, conditions and privileges of employment under the control of both entities. So it counts for both when separately employed and when they are jointly employed. That's the reasoning behind that addition we are suggesting, if you understand.

MS. BRODSKY: Can I ask you a question about that? When you say preclude a finding, do you have in mind who would be making that finding or is it sufficient to say that nothing in this definition shall preclude an individual from being an employee of both?

MR. LEBOWITZ: Or being considered an employee. 1 Yeah, I don't think there's any --3 MS. BRODSKY: There's no magic in the finding. MR. LEBOWITZ: No. Obviously we're thinking in 5 some cases of the finding of fact of the judge or someone analyzing a situation when you are claiming 7 joint employment in a lawsuit. So in that sense, there would be a finder or someone making that decision. But 9 I don't think you want to make any difference to the 10 substance. So the next page of our comment, page 3, 11 12 looking at -- again, in the definition, definition 1108, 13 Subsection G, which is page 6 of the Code of 14 Regulations. We have a number of suggestions for tinkering with this definition of employment benefit. 15 But the one I want to talk about right now is a -- when 16 17 you have time to look at these, you will see what we are 18 suggesting through some changes. I recommend 19 elimination of what is presently in G3. And then in 20 replacement, we would add this language for reasons that 21 are explained in the letter. But then we have some language that we believe should be -- what would be in 22 23 G3 once you eliminate the current G3. 24 And that accounts for the inclusion of interns and 25 volunteers, as must be done throughout the regulations

now with the passage of the new law incorporating -including interns and volunteers for coverage.

And that we would add to Section G3 that would read as follows: Employment benefit also includes the selection and training of any person for and the discharge of any person from any unpaid internship or volunteer position. Because right now as written, the employment benefit does not cover the situation where a volunteer or intern is discriminated against or has a loss of employment benefit for an unlawful reason or reasons prohibited by the act. So we just want to make sure that that is in there and made clear.

Then we come to what we consider perhaps the most important part of properly stating that within these regulations, current status of the law that is on the next page 1109, Subsection C, Principles of Employment Discrimination. Subsection C is on page 4 of our letter — is the place where the counsel is proposing language to essentially incapsulate — or as we read it, incapsulate the Harris versus City of Santa Monica case and the standard particularly for establishing discrimination in that case. And we have proposed a very lengthy revision and supplement to that section. The first thing to look at is in Subsection C as written right now. What we have suggested and it might seem

counterintuitive for an organization such as CELA to say 1 this, but we believe that in the principal analysis of the law that retaliation has to be included in the -- in the types of actions where this standard applies. the standard is the substantial motivating factor is what we're talking about. Right now the Harris decision 7 itself only dealt with discrimination, not retaliation. You know, you will see -- I'll address it in a second, 9 there's a couple of nuances to this, but as a general 10 proposition, the reasoning that the California Supreme Court used in reaching the substantial motivating factor 11 standard in a discrimination case cannot be -- in a 12 13 principal way cannot be distinguished if a retaliation claim where the retaliation claim includes or is based 14 on a denial of employment benefit as the source of 15 retaliation or is the cause of retaliation. So, for 16 17 instance, where a claim is for retaliation or 18 retaliatory termination that, as opposed to a 19 discriminatory termination, there really can be no 20 principle way to differentiate between the standard used 21 between those two cases. 22 Now, right now we know of -- I can't even count --23 there are so many cases that are pending in the Court of 24 Appeal on this particular question. There are -- in my 25 office alone, I think we have three. And they're all

over the state all pending in the Court of Appeal on 1 this particular question and we just -- the way we look a it, it's likely that the courts are going to come out this way. So we might as well take a look at it and see 5 really how it is going to play out. This is our best estimate or guess how it is going to play out in the 7 courts. I think it is best to address it in regulation. Frankly, by the time the regulatory process is through, 9 there would be guidelines. I would suggest at least one 10 published decision will come out on this issue before 11 these regulations are done. So it's something that will probably have some further torte on it as we proceed. 12 13 But there is a fine distinction to be made on this and 14 that is because of this: Retaliation can take many forms. Retaliation can also be in the form of 15 harassment. You can have someone who engages in a 16 17 protected activity. And in retaliation for that 18 protected activity, is actually suffering harassment. 19 That harassment, though not a denial of an employment 20 benefit as defined by the regulations and is a separate 21 standard for harassment, that harassment itself can be 22 retaliatory and itself is retaliation. So you have two 23 kind of parts for retaliation rights. Is it a 24 retaliation claim based on denial of employment benefits 25 or it is a retaliation based on harassment. And so we

have tried to draw that line and articulate that nuance 1 in the two subsections -- or in Subsection 2, at least, of what we suggested here on the bottom of page 4 and on to page 5. 5 So as we've written it, it reads as follows: "Retaliation prohibited by Government Code 1294.06, 7 Subdivision 8 may take many forms, including but not limited to denial of employment benefit or harassment. 9 The substantial motivating reason standard shall apply 10 when retaliation takes the form of denial of employment benefits. In circumstances where retaliation takes the 11 form of harassment, in standards articulated in 12 13 Section 11019 of the regulations shall apply. So we 14 tried to draw at that line, draw that distinction, and 15 draw the reader to the harassment sections and harassment standards within the regulations. This is 16 going to take some thought and some process, but we want 17 18 to start the discussion. You will also see -- so 19 Subsection C-1 that we proposed is the actual standard 20 of substantial motivating factor. And we think that's 21 important to spell out in these regulations. And we 22 have given you the authority for this specific language 23 that we used and it's all California Supreme Court 24 authority, which you will see. It's really remarkable 25 when you look at because when we are employment lawyers.

We kind of look at cases with blinders on, in a sense 1 that we are always looking at employment cases, employment cases and how they look at certain -- how courts are using language and oftentimes it is unique in 5 employment cases. But the California Supreme Court when it decided that the substantial motivating reason 7 standard was the correct reason or the correct standard in the Harris case, when you go back and look at Supreme 9 Court precedents, you will see that the Supreme Court 10 across disciplinary and across areas of laws has used 11 that language, substantial motivating reason and substantial motivating factor in all kinds of areas of 12 13 law. And there is a settled and very clear standard 14 that the California Supreme Court is referring to when it says, "Substantial Motivating Reason." And that 15 language that we put in here in the proposed Subsection 16 17 C-1, is that specific language. We cited you those 18 cases, so you can go read it yourselves. 19 criminal cases, asbestos cases. There's all kinds of 20 different cases where the substantial factor is defined. 21 And, in fact, it has also been incapsulated in the jury instructions in KC430. So that is where we believe --22 23 what we believe the Supreme Court was doing and what it 24 meant and when it said substantial motivating reason in 25 the Harris case. And since this is a -- we're trying to

articulate the standard here in these regulations. 1 think it is appropriate to put that definition here in the regulations because then it's clear. There is no issue. No one has to worry about it again. This is right there for everybody. And this is somebody that all stakeholders will be pleased with, a clear standard. 7 This is one of those things that everyone is arguing about all of the time -- what is the standard and what does this really mean. 10 When you look at the case law in a principle way, you should see what the California Supreme Court was 11 doing what it always has done, when it talks about 12 13 substantial motivating factor and it's using that same 14 language and the same reasoning as these other cases we 15 do. MS. PEREZ: Can I ask a question on the 16 17 Subsection 2 language on retaliation? 18 MR. LEBOWITZ: Yes. 19 MS. PEREZ: This is the first time I've seen 20 the language, so I want to make sure I understand it 21 clearly. 22 MR. LEBOWITZ: Yes. 23 MS. PEREZ: Because I've seen this in the workplace so much, I know when I do training, one of the 24 big questions that I get refer to harassment with a 25

little H and harassment with a big H, meaning the 1 unlawful harassment versus layman's term of annoying behavior that may not rise to the level of unlawful behavior. Which are you referring to? So, for example, I have seen allegations of retaliation where the adverse action is the person is annoying me. Again, harassment with a smaller H, I had seen other ones where the person is alleging the retaliatory act. It would be something 9 that maybe would fall under the definition to meet the 10 elements and the standard of harassment with a capital 11 н. 12 Is that distinction in here? 13 MR. LEBOWITZ: It is not. That's actually a remarkable distinction that I did not consider when I 14 wrote that. Absolutely that distinction, in the sense 15 16 that --17 MS. PEREZ: Because I think that the way it's written now, you are saying that the only way it can be 18 19 an adverse action is if it meets the criteria for 20 unlawful harassment. 21 MR. LEBOWITZ: I agree and I think that's incorrect. I think that so -- and so -- and we talked 22 23 to clients about this all the time. We have to tell our 24 clients that -- our potential clients -- that what they 25 are experiencing may be obnoxious. It may be

unsettling. It may be offensive, but not based on one 1 of the listed characteristics of the protected character in 1294.08, then it's not unlawful. It is probably bad business and it's probably really obnoxious behavior, but the law doesn't really care about it. But in the case of retaliation, I think it does. I think you're 7 right in that it should be included. That type of behavior, if it is -- if there's a causal nexus between 9 the protected activity and the small H harassment, I 10 think that's unlawful, I think. MS. PEREZ: I am not stating an opinion, but I 11 want to make sure I understood where we should fall. 12 13 MR. LEBOWITZ: I think you are absolutely 14 correct. And to the extent that we reference -- and I think that ours is too limiting in the language in the 15 sense that we reference Section 11019. And I think that 16 17 is where it becomes -- I think that's potentially too 18 limiting remarks to say that that in our -- that we --19 that the language we're suggesting is a starting point 20 discussion. 21 MS. PEREZ: Sure. MR. LEBOWITZ: And I think that this is the 22 exactly type of discussion we were hoping to spark. 23 I would amend or remark to strike the section 11019 24 25 reference. But there may be some other way to deal with

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it, but that's my initial thought just standing here
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   right now.
            MS. PEREZ: Yeah. I mean, that's kind of what
   I assumed you were going to say, but then I guess the
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   question would become for future. I am not going to put
   you on the spot to define harassment with a small H in
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   regulation because to --
            MR. LEBOWITZ: Right, I get it.
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            MS. PEREZ: To distinguish it from the other
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   one.
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            MR. LEBOWITZ: I'm sure we will do some great
   work on this subject.
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            MS. PEREZ: I appreciate the way you explained
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   it.
        Thank you.
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            MR. LEBOWITZ: And so the next thing I would
   like to talk about today is on page 7 of our comments
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   dealing with Section 11034, Terms, Conditions,
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   Privileges of Employment.
        So page -- looking at page 23, Subsection F2A.
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   This is the section that talks about severity of
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   pervasiveness. And the only -- you'll see in our --
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   that we have suggested adding a sentence in the middle
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   of this section to account for the D versus Vintage
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   Petroleum decision from 2003 that we cited for you.
                                                         And
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   the language we propose is: A single less severe
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unwelcome act of harassment may create an unlawful, 1 hostile work environment when committed by a supervisor. Those are the facts of D. It is really the only case that talks about it, so it is presently the state of the law on that issue - on that very discrete issue, so we just wanted to point that out. 7 And as we're on this page 23 of the proposed regulation, there are two items that we neglected to 9 include in our written comments I wanted to talk about 10 really quickly. In the very top of the page in the definition of quid pro quo, sexual harassment. 11 current proposal reads quid pro quo is characterized by 12 13 explicit or implicit conditioning of -- and language is 14 a job or promotion. And really, it ought to be an employment benefit. It should not be limited to a job 15 16 or promotion. So it should be consistent with the rest of the regulations of employment benefit. And then in 17 18 the references that support -- that are listed in 19 support of this entire section of the -- a very long 20 section, it's 11034, there a lot of different issues 21 covered. One case we would like to see in the reference in the authority is Johnson Control case, U.S. Supreme 22 23 Court case of Johnson Controls which would be in support 24 of 11034, Subsection D, dangers to health and safety, 25 reproduction functions. And then I don't have the site,

but I think everyone knows what I am talking about 1 Johnson Controls case. And the inclusion of the Fair Rivers versus the City of Boca Ratan case, we think it's misplaced and should be in federal law and has not been incorporated into state law and it's a confusing reference when included here in the regulations. 7 There's a different standard when that specific question was raised in the California Supreme Court, it was not 9 adopted. Instead an alternative test was adopted. 10 think it is confusing to have that reference throughout or in the regulations. 11 12 MS. BRODSKY: Could you send a slightly -- just 13 in an e-mail or something with the citation for that, for the -- what it does not adopt? 14 15 MR. LEBOWITZ: Yeah. MS. BRODSKY: Thanks. And also the citation 16 for Johnson Controls case? 17 18 MR. LEBOWITZ: U.S. supreme Court, yeah. 19 And then just a couple more. Oh, looking at age 20 discrimination now, so 11075, so page 69. Just a --21 some additions in the 11075, Subsection A, age based 22 stereotype. We like the way this reads now. We would 23 think it would be enhanced to include just the phrases 24 "appearance and demeanor" in that language, as well. 25 think the experience of our members have been that is a

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very common theme that we see especially in Silicon
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   Valley cases these days and the tech industry where age
   discrimination are becoming so much more prevalent and
   so much more blatant that these types of things such as
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   appearance and demeanor have become a very routine means
   of excluding employees and ultimately taking adverse
7
   actions again then.
            MS. PEREZ: Can you give some specific examples
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   what types of -- how they don't fit in and what your
10
   clients have said about them? I have not heard about
   this before.
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            MR. LEBOWITZ: Off the top of my head, I can't
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13
   give you that.
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            MS. BRODSKY: How about gray hair?
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            MR. LEBOWITZ: Appearance and demeanor. Well,
   frankly some of these things are getting real blatant.
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   We have a client coming from related industries. You
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   would not necessarily think the solar industry is a tech
19
   industry, but it pretty much is. And there is
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   several -- we have seen several cases come out of that
21
   industry and several clients come out of that where the
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   age bias is blatant.
23
            MS. PEREZ: Is it like skinny jeans versus mom
24
   jeans?
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            MR. LEBOWITZ: We have one e-mail from one of
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these guy old guys. 1 MS. PEREZ: But that is --MR. LEBOWITZ: That's direct evidence. MS. PEREZ: I'm trying to imagine what the 5 circumstantial stuff would be like. 6 MR. LEBOWITZ: Yeah, you know, this is 7 something that came up in discussion. I don't have any particular specific examples for you right now. I am sure we can give it to you. 10 MS. PEREZ: It would be helpful for me just because they are kind of vague. 11 12 MR. MANDELBAUM: I have one for you, Council 13 Member Perez. I had a case where the supervisor making future employment decisions characterizes silver tsunami 14 15 looking around the room. 16 MS. PEREZ: Yeah, I guess where my guestion is coming from is that or like gray hair is something that 17 18 is very closely linked to age, unfortunately. So I am 19 trying to think of something -- I don't want it to be 20 overbroad, if somebody says we expect you to dress 21 professionally. So that somehow can be misinterpreted 22 as you are discriminating against me for some reason. 23 The example you are giving me to is pretty direct. It 24 is sort of referring to a characteristic that is 25 associated with old age as opposed to something that

might be more subtle. 1 MR. MANDELBAUM: Right. MS. PEREZ: Any examples, I would appreciate it. 5 MR. LEBOWITZ: Yeah, I can certainly give you Going back to our committee -- there is banter 7 about in our committee meetings that there was a lot of examples. But I just didn't happen to take them down, 9 but I believe I can get you that information. 10 MS. PEREZ: Thank you. MR. LEBOWITZ: Final thing I want to talk about 11 12 is age discrimination. I don't -- I was reading -- I 13 don't believe there was -- there is not, as I see, a 14 suggestion or proposal to add anything to Section 11076 regulations. 11076 is the establishing age 15 discrimination regulation, so it's not in the packet. 16 17 It's not something where there is a proposed 18 modification. I don't know how procedurally we deal 19 with that's because it's not in the proposal, but we 20 would suggest that the council would look at 11076 for 21 possible amendment because it is -- um, we believe it's in need of an amendment because it doesn't account for 22 23 Government Code 12941. And it's an important distinction 12941 talks about because it is distinction 24 25 that is different from federal law in substance.

- 1 | Because in federal law under the ADDA, a decision based
- 2 on economics is not an indication of age discrimination,
- 3 where in the California law, it can be. So, for
- 4 | instance, if you are terminating someone who is a
- 5 | long-term employee because you can pay someone else less
- for doing the same job, under the ADDA, that is not an
- 7 | indicator of age discrimination. Under state law, under
- 8 | 12941, it is potentially an indicator of age
- 9 discrimination under indirect discrimination case. So
- 10 | that distinction is not accounted for in the regulation
- 11 | right now. We believe that Section 11076 is the place
- 12 to do it and ought to be made.
- MS. BRODSKY: Thank you very much for your
- 14 | contribution.
- MS. PEREZ: Thank you.
- MR. LEBOWITZ: And now, Ms. Harrington has a
- 17 | few more comments from our committee if that is all
- 18 right.
- 19 MR. MANDELBAUM: Thank you, Mr. Lebowitz.
- MS. HARRINGTON: Thank you. Unfortunately I
- 21 only have one copy that I will need to speak from, but I
- 22 | will give to Mr. Sperber afterward so that he can
- 23 reference it. I only have a couple of substantive
- 24 changes that I want to address. And if we look at
- 25 page 10 of the regulations, it's Section 11023B. And it

refers to a list of things that must be included in a
policy on discrimination, harassment, retaliation

prevention. And, of course, the first thing that needs
to be stated in any such policy is that discrimination,
harassment and retaliation are prohibited and will not
be tolerable. So just some basic firm statements of
this conduct that will not be retaliated. And from the
perspective of the harasser, the harasser needs to be
put on notice of the conduct that constitutes harassing
conduct.

And so we would also like maybe some further examples or alternatively a reference to the DFEH brochure that you mentioned to give the potential harasser adequate notice of the kind of conduct that we are talking about and Ms. Harris, you had talked --well, I heard your comments about what constitutes harassment versus what constitutes harassment conduct. And just thinking off the top of my head about your comment to Mr. Lebowitz, probably the places to look for the distinction is in the DFEH function and has a greatly cited writing and example of harassing conduct which may rise to the level of severe or preventative and, thereof, become harassment, unlawful with a capital H under the law.

So maybe the brochure can give the council guidance

on there. And then the Yanowitz case, Yanowitz versus 1 L'Oreal, has examples of harassing conduct which might not be in and of itself an adverse employment action, but in the conglomerate, it rises to the level of creating a hostile work environment. So that is just my two cents off the top of my head in response to your 7 comment about harassing with a cap H and harassment with a small H. 9 The other substantive comment I have is on page 33. 10 And it is Section 11042, Pregnancy Disability Leave at Subdivision B, Subdivision C. And this is just a 11 12 philosophical problem I am having with the way the 13 regulations have been drafted. Instead of being a sort 14 of one stop shop for all of the law, the council, I think, is making it less easy to reference what is 15 actually at issue. And here is a good example: 16 17 cross-reference to Government Code Section 12945 18 requires the person to go in search for 12945 and find 19 that what is in 12945 is, in fact, the language that is 20 been stricken, the 1 and 2. So it seems to me that it 21 actually deters -- inhibits the ease of reference, 22 having all of these cross-references rather than just 23 including them in or putting the reference in the 24 reference section of the regulation. 25

MR. MANDELBAUM: That is one we have struggled

with often because of the administrative procedure, but 1 certainly your opinion is in line with the great weight of public opinion on the subject of clarity or versus non-duplication. 5 MS. HARRINGTON: In that same vane, the one that's most trouble to me is the fact that in Section 7 11008, going back to the definition of intern and volunteer. Let's see. 9 MS. BRODSKY: It's J, page 7. 10 THE WITNESS: Yes. Thank you. I -- having written regulations myself, I understand what council is 11 trying to do. But someone's coming to the regulation 12 13 with the first use and not knowing to cross-reference the definition of an intern or unpaid intern or 14 volunteer, won't know that a specific section later in 15 the regulations apply to them if they haven't read this 16 17 section. 18 And so although it is cumbersome, I would ask that 19 the counsel actually reiterate applicants, employees, 20 unpaid intern and volunteer in each of the sections or, 21 at the very least, reference AB1443 and this code 22 section, Title 2, 11008J in the reference section 23 underneath each and every regulation where the word 24 employee is used so that there is at least an 25 opportunity for someone just looking up a single

regulation to know that it also applies to interns and 1 volunteers. On page 40 and that is Section 11049, Subdivision D, Distribution of Notices, this section asks the council that electronic posting is sufficient to meet this posting requirement provided it's posted 7 electronically and in a conspicuous place or places for employees would tend to view it in the workplace. And I 9 am just having trouble understanding where is a 10 conspicuous place in the workplace with where it can be 11 posted electronically. MR. MANDELBAUM: 12 I think because this came up 13 in the CFR regulations. 14 MS. HARRINGTON: Right. 15 MR. MANDELBAUM: I think what we -- what we were trying to clarify is that workplaces differ. 16 17 Sometimes posting electronically will be more effective 18 than posting on a board. And sometimes there aren't any 19 computers which would never be conspicuous, but the idea 20 is to try to create a flexible idea of using your work 21 place, it's got to be posted inconspicuously. If you're 22 someone that's spending the whole day on the computer 23 and haven't been in a break room for five years, then 24 maybe there is something that pops up on an Internet 25 site that's more conspicuous posting a hard copy.

think the idea is for that to be the underlying 1 standard, it has to be conspicuous and posted in workplace if it's electronically. If it is hard copy, you know, where are employees entering to view these things? 6 MS. BRODSKY: Did you think it was sufficiently 7 dealt with in the Stiffer regs? MS. HARRINGTON: I have to admit I didn't -- I 9 wasn't part of the discussion of Stiffer regs regarding 10 that; so I can comment. MS. BRODSKY: It's in the proposal 11095. 11 so you might want to take a look at that. And it does 12 13 -- just off the top of my head, it does seem to make 14 sense to have them be consistent, but I would like to get inputs on whether you think that sufficiently deals 15 with the posting. 16 THE WITNESS: I would happy to send a follow-up 17 18 e-mail to you tomorrow rather than this afternoon 19 because I can't get back to my office until tomorrow. 20 MR. MANDELBAUM: I am not sure how that works 21 technically. Certainly your public comments are within 22 the windows. Maybe an example would be to do -- I think 23 it new people. I think the underlying statute -- or 24 standard makes sense, but maybe it is as simple as 25 coming up with an example for -- in what context an

electronic posting would be a conspicuous place in the workplace.

MS. HARRINGTON: Then the rest of my comments aren't really about so much the substance of the regulations. They deal primarily with the references at the end of each section. We have the authority statement and then the reference section. And I need to 7 tell you a very brief story about experiences that members have had and I had a similar experience where 9 10 the judge has said because it didn't include the 11 specific code section that it applied to, it doesn't apply to that section in the references. And therefore, 12 13 this regulation does not interpret that section. that is how this kind of minutia can affect the outcome 14 15 There is also a story about -- and this of cases. happened to me -- where a judge looked at the DFEH 16 procedure regulations which start, "These regulations 17 18 apply only to the Department of Fair Employment and 19 Housing," and he took that to apply to all of the 20 regulations, all of them. So when you use those 21 pronouns, instead of saying sections so-and-so and 22 sections so-and-so of these regulations, that's how 23 picky we need to be when writing these regulations 24 because that's the kind of outcome -- unintended 25 consequences that they can have.

So let me just ask you: On that 1 MS. BRODSKY: point when you said that the section needs to be specifically referenced. For example, throughout we just referenced to FMLA regs, then 29CFRA25. MS. HARRINGTON: I have very specific examples how I think it needs to be referenced. And the place 7 where you find it in the Administrative Procedures Act is Section 11346.5. And that's just been recently 9 amended, so that was effective January 1st, 2013, the 10 new amendment. And basically, if we just look at the 11 first bunch in particular, you will see what I mean. On page 4, at the beginning of 1108, you referenced that as 12 13 used in this chapter. But then at the bottom of the 14 regulations, where you have the reference to and the reference to the authority under the regulations 15 proposed and reference to the particular code sections 16 or other provisions of law that are being implemented, 17 18 interpreted or made specific, that is what needs to be 19 there according to the Administrative Procedures Code. 20 So if you look at the end, you don't have the whole of 21 this chapter referenced at the end. You only have 22 12925, 12940, 12941, 12942. So this chapter needs to be 23 referenced in there whenever the code section is, 24 whatever the ended code subsection is. Then at least --25 at the very least, you should include 12926 and 12923.1,

which are the other definition sections. And then it would also -- I think it also needs to include the reference to the bill that is the source of authority for the need to provide the amendments and, in this case, AB1443, set 2014, Chapter 302, which is the bill regarding the unpaid interns and volunteers should be referenced at the end of each and every section since employee is used in each and every section. That bill needs to be referenced about at the end, I believe. MR. MANDELBAUM: Right. But aren't those bills -- with respect to the bills, aren't the bills -- I mean the bills are amending the underlying Government Code as referenced, right? Your understanding is that we need to reference the bill rather than the Government Code as amended? Well, you have it all in your MS. HARRINGTON: initial statement reasons you referenced. I think all bills except for perhaps the one referring to human trafficking. But it's my understanding and the Office

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initial statement reasons you referenced. I think all bills except for perhaps the one referring to human trafficking. But it's my understanding and the Office of Administrative Law -- what I am trying to do is to prevent the Office of Administrative Law, giving it back and having yet another delay in the implementation of these regulations because it didn't comply with the Administrative Procedures Act, which says that you have to have the source. And it seems to me the bill is the

source of why you need it in there. It is the authority 1 for the amendment just the way you site case law underneath. So I think you have to have at least the bill number and both initial statement of reasons in the 5 reference section -- following each section. That is my interpretation of this and that is my experience with the Office of Administrative Law. 7 MS. BRODSKY: I suppose we can just ask them 9 what they need. 10 MS. HARRINGTON: Yes, absolutely. Yeah. all of the rest of my comments really are addressed to 11 that concern so they're all just procedural comments. 12 13 And I can just hand them off in writing if you wish or I 14 can or go through them on the website. There is really nothing substantive here. 15 MR. MANDELBAUM: We will certainly review 16 17 anything you submit in writing thoroughly, but you 18 always have the floor for as the long as you want. 19 MS. HARRINGTON: Okay. I will go through this 20 roughly then. I am on page 7. Again, here, does this 21 reference need to be to the entire chapter? No, just the specific code section and the AB1143, the intern and 22 23 volunteer, instead 214, comment on Chapter 302. 24 And then on page 8, you rely on -- you mentioned 25 Subdivision D on Civil Code 50225 and Penal Code Section

236.1, so they are sources of authority for this and 1 should be listed there, as well. And then the -- I didn't have the -- I couldn't find the bill number for the human trafficking law. I think it was passed in 2012, but I think that also needs to be mentioned here. 6 And then, of course, the global mention of AB1443. 7 At the very least, it should include Government Code 12926 through 1261296, which are sources for definition because these need to be interpreted in -- consistently 10 with those two sections that provide the other definitions. 11 On page 9, again AB1443 needs to be added to the 12 13 intern and volunteer. And then 12926 -- I am not so 14 sure about 12926.1 here because 12926.1 only deals with disability and this is primarily about harassment. I 15 think 12926 needs to be mentioned here. 16 Page 11, again, addition 12926 and 12926.1, and if 17 we look at Subdivision 7, it's sections 11023, B7. This 18 19 is part of the comment for objections to the word "valid 20 complaint," a valid compliant. Under the (inaudible) 21 City of Oakland, a good faith complaint is sufficient 22 rather than a valid complaint. 23 And so if the council adopts the strickening of that or a change to assert good faith for the City of 24 25 Oakland in the reference section.

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On page 17, again the bill should be referenced and
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   it's from the initial statement of reasons,
   AB20553-2014, Chapter 306. On page 18. The reference
   should include AB1660 [sic] period, 2014, Chapter 452.
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            MS. PEREZ: Can I interrupt for a second to ask
   a question?
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            MS. HARRINGTON: Sure.
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            MS. PEREZ: I am looking at the letter that Mr.
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   Lebowitz provided and it does not -- just the last
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   statement you made about changing down to good faith and
   I don't see that in there that was provided.
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        Is that going to be in your written comments you
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   are submitting?
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            MS. HARRINGTON: Yes. That is mine. It's not
   Stephen's comment.
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            MS. PEREZ: Okay. I just want to make sure we
   have it in writing.
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            MS. HARRINGTON: I think Stephen is saying take
   it out entirely, but, in my opinion, we already have law
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   on this. It says it doesn't have to be a valid
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   complaint -- the harassment doesn't have to arise to
22
   capital H harassment. Simply harassing conduct is
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   sufficient and the employee makes a complaint and has
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   good faith suspicion, that is sufficient under the law.
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            MS. PEREZ: I just want to make sure it is in
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writing somewhere. 1 MS. HARRINGTON: Just in my handwritten notes here that I am going to give to Mr. Sperber. MS. PEREZ: Okay. Thank you. 5 MS. HARRINGTON: Page 18, A, Statutory Source. Again 12926, page 302 needs to be included and the bill 7 numbers -- I don't have the specific bill number there for the gender expression, gender ID. 9 MR. MANDELBAUM: I think that's B559 and AB 887. 10 MS. HARRINGTON: That's right. Okay. And then 11 on page 19, again 12926 needs to be inserted there. And 12 13 further down under Section 11030, needs to be AB559, 14 stats 2011, Chapter 261, Chapter 261, and AB817, Chapter 719 inserted for the source of authority for 11030. 15 And on page 20, again Government Code 12926 and 16 17 then SB292, stats 2013, Chapter 88. Page 24, SB559 and 18 AB887 should be there and, of course, I already asked 19 for AB1443 to include in all of the sections, the 20 volunteer and the unpaid volunteers, unpaid interns and 21 volunteers. 22 Then, again, on page 51, Section 11060, the referenced bill is AB1964, stats 2012, Chapter 287. 23 24 And on page 52, the last one, the reference there 25 for Section 11063 should be AB19164, stats 2012, Chapter

207. 1 MR. MANDELBAUM: Great. Thank you. Is there additional public comment related to the Fair Employment Housing Act regulations? Anyone else wishing to provide testimony on this? 6 Seeing none, have we received any e-mails that we're aware of related to this? 7 MS. BILLOTTI: We have received written public 9 comments via e-mail from -- a couple on Friday and we 10 received some today. MR. MANDELBAUM: Obviously that will be part of 11 12 the record. But anyone else wishing to go provide 13 testimony during the hearing? I don't believe so. 14 Seeing no one else wishes to provide testimony, um, we would like to thank you for taking the time to 15 provide public comments regarding issues on the proposed 16 17 amendment to the regulations. We will accept written 18 comments on the proposed amendment to the FEHA regulation until 5:00 p.m. today, December 8, 2014. 19

Anyone who testified here today or submits written comments will receive a copy of any changes or amendments the council makes to its proposed amendments to the FEHA regulations. Also, anyone who testified or submits written comments will have a 15-day period within which to make written comments on any changes to

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   the proposed amendments to the FEHA regulations.
   council will consider each comment made here today, as
   well as all written comments received. The council will
   respond to each comment in writing and respond a
   statement of reasons which will become part of the
   council's rulemaking record. Again, we thank you for
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   your testimony and participation in the rulemaking
   process.
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        The hearing portion of this meeting is now
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   adjourned.
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             (Concluded at 2:35 p.m.)
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